Nudging with information: a randomized field experiment on reminders and feedback* Can people be helped to stick to their plans with a little help from information? We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of reminders and feedback on investment activities involving up-front costs and delayed benefits, such as education and healthy behavior. By means of a randomized field experiment, we show that simple weekly reminders induce users of a gym to substantially increase their levels of physical exercise. We show that limited attention helps explain our results, and we find evidence of mental accounting in users' response to the stimulus of reminders. These results show that virtuous behavior, such as following a healthy life style, can be promoted without the need for monetary incentives: providing incentives through information is both effective and cheap.
Introduction
When individuals perform activities requiring immediate costs or effort, and delivering benefits in the future, they tend to under-invest and perform poorly even by their own judgment. For example, education requires the up-front effort and investment of pupils and parents, and may guarantee higher income in the future; consequently under-education is a common phenomenon often leading to poverty traps. Similarly, a healthy life-style requires to restrain from certain current unhealthy behavior and to do physical activity, but the benefits are not immediately tangible, and are in fact delayed. It is also commonly accepted that an unhealthy life-style and limited physical exercise may lead to diabetes, cardiovascular disease and obesity, which the same individuals regret ex-post.
In these and other similar cases, public policies are often advocated on two grounds: firstly, in an attempt to alleviate the negative impact, and treat the consequences, of suboptimal behavior; secondly, in order to prevent individuals from making poor, uninformed choices. With regard to the question of prevention, monetary incentives have been widely used to try and induce virtuous behavior, with largely beneficial effects. For example, within the context of suboptimal physical exercise as documented by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) , Charness and Gneezy (2010) (CG hereafter) have shown just how effective monetary incentives can be. In one of their studies (costing $6000 for eighty individuals), they offered up to $125 for at least nine visits over a period of five weeks, and observed that after treatment the chosen individuals continued to attend with greater frequency than had been the case before. As for education, the program studied by Angrist and Levy (2009) , costing $650,000 and designed to increase school certification rates, proved to be a success, albeit mainly for girls. 1 Given the enormous direct and indirect social costs of poor individual behavior on education and health, it is not surprising that all of these studies show that the large amounts of money at stake in these programs were indeed employed in a worthwhile manner. 2 In this paper we are going to investigate whether desirable, comparable effects can be obtained by motivating individuals without providing them with monetary incentives. In particular, we shall be focusing on the idea that providing individuals with information, through reminders and feedback on past activities, may affect their behavior as desired, and we shall explore the underlying mechanisms of such incentives. We believe this to be important since providing monetary incentives, although effective, can prove very costly for public finances, as the previous figures show, and in the case of certain countries it may not even be affordable. On the other hand, providing incentives with the help of effective information, if effective, is very cheap, especially in this age of mass information and telecommunication technology.
To this end, we offer an empirical and theoretical analysis of the effect of information, in the form of reminders and feedback, on investment activities. Firstly, we provide a parsimonious theoretical framework based on a few behavioral assumptions, namely present-bias preference, limited attention and a form of mental accounting related to sunk costs, which delivers a number of testable implications regarding the effect of reminders and feedback. We then provide related empirical evidence based on a randomized field experiment concerning exercising in a gym, which has been the subject of many recent studies. Within this context, we have monitored membership and attendance to a given gym (managed by the sports association at the University of Bologna, Italy), both before, during and after the delivery of information to certain individuals, our treatment. In particular, the informed (treated) users received a weekly e-mail reminding them of the possibility they had to exercise in the gym, and to obtain feedback about their own past activity through a personalized web page (accessible with personal credentials). Users in the control group, on the other hand, received no such reminders and were not able to access the aforesaid feedback. Our membership and attendance data span the entire population of the gym from January 2008 to August 2010 (967 student users for the academic year 2008-2009 together with 568 new users who joined the following year). The experiment was run from 1 September 2009 to 15 March 2010, with 243 users participating (55% of the active population in this time window). 3 We identified the remarkably strong effect of information, which proved capable of significantly increasing monthly attendance figures. By subdividing the population into highattendance and low-attendance users (on the basis of mean monthly attendance figures prior to the treatment period), we saw that treated low-attendance users exercised 2 more times per -month during treatment compared with the control group, representing an increase of more than 25%. This effect is remarkably strong due also to the fact that our low-attendance users are quite active at the baseline, exercising nearly 7 times per -month, a figure which would put them in the group of regular users of Charness and Gneezy. Following termination of the treatment, i.e. when e-mails were no longer sent out, treated and control groups' behavior converged, although treated users continued to attend more frequently, possibly as the result of habit formation (as also reported by CG in the case of monetary incentives). We also use regression analysis to show that reminders have a strong, highly-significant impact by increasing the probability of attending during the 12-36 hours following receipt of the e-mail. 4 Why do simple reminders lead to increased attendance? Our theoretical model shows that fully rational individuals, and even present-biased users, should not be affected by reminder, whereas they might have an effect on individuals with limited memory and/or who adopt some form of mental accounting based on sunk membership costs. Our field experiment provides some interesting observations regarding this question. Firstly, if we consider all users (both treated and controls) in the period prior to treatment, the daily probability of attendance for those with a flat-rate monthly membership significantly decreases from the first to the fourth week of the month in question. Secondly, reminders have a non-diminishing effect during a person's membership. Thirdly, we show that reminders have a strong effect as long as an individual's attendance does not yet "justify" purchase of the flat-rate membership, i.e. when the up-front membership payment is greater than the overall cost of a pay-per-visit alternative (the difference between these two costs being the current status of the user's "mental account", which is "in the red" in this case). We use our theoretical analysis to show that these findings are not consistent with users uniquely affected by present-biased preferences. What is more, we illustrate that our evidence is instead consistent with reminders inducing people to get more physical exercise, since they not only increase individuals' attention (limited memory), but they also rekindle the initial expense of joining and attending the gym (mental accounting). This second element could also contribute to explain the flat-rate bias often observed in these markets (e.g. DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006 show that users tend to take out flat-rate gym contracts more than would be expected according to optimal choice). Indeed, membership may serve as a commitment device for sophisticated users not only by reducing the immediate cost of exercise compared with pay-per-visit contract, but also for the extra motivation to attend that is present as long as a person's mental account is in the red.
Our results are related to the vast amount of theoretical and empirical studies of investment goods and behavioral biases. CG were interested in verifying whether, after a period of intense exercise induced by monetary incentives, healthy habits persisted over time, and they showed that this is the case for non-regular users (attending up to 3 times a week) when observed for a period of up to two-and-a-half months after treatment. These results have been confirmed by Acland and Levy (2011) , who also used monetary incentives and showed that habits indeed persist, although they tend to weaken over time and are significantly diminished by long vacations. Our results are comparable when considering the effects we document during treatment, and observing that our low-attendance users are very active at the baseline. What is more, we were able to obtain these comparable effects at no cost, and this has significant implications for public policy. 5 Monetary incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation, as documented by CG regarding their regular users who reduce attendance when monetary incentives are removed. Our findings, on the other hand, show no such effects, probably because nudging individuals "softly" through the provision of information allows them to continue with their pre-treatment decisions. This is another important policy implication, as targeting monetary incentives to the "right group" may be difficult, whilst information seems to self select as required. This paper is also related to the recent studies of limited memory. Karlan et al. (2009) test a theory of limited attention span by randomly reminding account holders to make savings deposits, and showing that reminders increase savings balances by about 6%. Stango and Zinman (2010) and Zwane et al. (2009) have shown that exposure to surveys may affect savings and investment behavior since they catch people's attention. As with these studies, we share the effectiveness of repeated reminders, although we differ from them in our analysis of alternative motivation and the role of feedback.
Thaler's theory of mental accounting (1999) is clearly pertinent to our experiment, providing a motivating environment for some of our results. Gourville and Soman (1998) provide a qualitative analysis showing a decreasing path for exercise during gym membership among a small pool of 33 gym users , although they used semester-long contracts which may have been affected by seasonal trends. A number of psychological studies also show, through real and hypothetical experiments, that individuals seem to be affected by sunk costs (see Arkes 1996 among others). Baliga and Ely (2011) explain the sunk cost effect as a consequence of a memory bias when a decision-maker does not remember the reasons for undertaking a project in the first place, and the initial sunk cost may thus bring back information on future utility. Our results seem to be inconsistent with this idea, since our users respond to reminders when the status of the mental account is "in the red". Finally feedback has been shown to be effective in reducing electricity consumption as well (Sexton et al. 1987 ). This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model that 5 The total cost of setting up the server technology for our dedicated web site amounts to approximately $1000, while thousands of users can be addressed.
will be used to derive certain testable implications of different behavioral biases. Section 3 illustrates our field experiment and the data in question. Section 4 presents the main results regarding the effects of reminders. The ensuing Section 5 illustrates what motivates people's decision to acquire feedback and the effects of that feedback. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
A model of investment with limited memory and mental accounting
In any period t ∈ [1, T ] an individual may perform an investment activity involving "attending" (a gym) with immediate cost c t and a benefit b (better health and fitness) which is delayed by one-period. The cost is stochastic, IID, with distribution F and strictly positive density f over the support [0,c] ,c ≤ b. To perform the activity, the individual must purchase one of the following options. She may subscribe a flat-rate membership at t = 0 paying L T up-front for the right to freely attend in any of the following T periods. Alternatively, he/she can pay-per-visit at unitary price p for each session. The discount factor is normalized to one for the sake of simplicity and we assume risk neutrality and no cash constraints. The decision to attend in t, or otherwise, is indicated, respectively, with d t = 1 and d t = 0.
The individual may be subject to certain behavioral biases. He/she may be presentbiased in which case all future payoffs are discounted by the same factor β ≤ 1. 6 He/she may also be inattentive so that with probability λ t the possibility of attending at t is not salient compared with alternative activities, and thus, necessarily, d t = 0. Finally, if the individual subscribes a membership at t = 0, he/she may introspectively construe a mental account A t which affects his/her decisions through a "transaction utility" v(A t ) which is weakly increasing and concave, with v(0) = 0 (Thaler, 2004) . This accounts for the possibility of the up-front payment L T continuing to be salient over the T periods and affecting decisions, even if sunk after t = 0. Although several different accounting rules could be used, we have adopted a reasonable, simple rule which we will empirically test, and which implies an account
where
is total past attendance. When A t < 0, past attendance D t is still too low at date t to rationalize the cost of membership and the account at that date is in the "red", whereas when A t ≥ 0 the account is said in the "black". By attending at t, the individual who subscribed a membership obtains the payoff −c t + βb and also the introspective payoff associated with the change in the transaction utility for one additional session, i.e. ∆v(A t ) ≡ v(A t + p) − v(A t ). Since the salience of the up-front payment L T may decrease over time, we posit that the mental accounting effect at t is depreciated according to δ t ∈ [0, 1] (when δ t = 0 mental accounting has no effect). 7 Hence, at t > 0, with probability 1 − λ t , the individual is attentive and attends if
Reminders. At date t the individual may receive a reminder of the chance to attend (i.e. a stimulus, indicated with r t = 1) in which case the probability of being attentive at a later date t = t + dt becomes 1 − λρ(dt) where λ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ(·) is a non-decreasing, concave function, with ρ(0) = 0 and ρ(∞) = 1. At the date of receipt of the reminder, the probability of being inattentive temporarily drops to zero (i.e. λ t = 0 for dt = 0) and then starts rising again towards λ. 8 The stimulus of the reminder may also revamp the sunk cost and its associated mental accounting, so that the depreciation rate
Hence, upon receiving a reminder at date t, the probability of attendance at a later date
Regardless of the possibility of receiving reminders in the future, we naturally posit that the decision to subscribe a membership at t = 0 is equivalent to the stimulus of a reminder provided at that date. Hence, if no reminder is received, the probability of inattention at any t > t = 0 is λρ(t ) which converges to λ, and, similarly, the mental accounting effect depreciates at a rate of δ(1 − ρ(t )) which converges to zero.
Testable implications. This simple model implies certain testable implications which we will consider in the ensuing empirical analysis.
7 Although mental accounting is intuitively related to the possible regret of an individual after subscribing a membership, one can show that the direct application of regret theory first developed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) does not enable us to identify any specific effect of reminders based on this different behavioral assumption.
8 The decaying effect of memory stimulus is supported by a considerable number of empirical psychological studies, which would suggest that a good fit for the function 1 − ρ(·), also known as the "retention function", is a power function with an asymptote. See Rubin and Wenzel (1996) among others. 9 In order to simplify the presentation, without any loss of generality, we assume that any new reminders supersede the effects of previous reminders. Implication 1. "With no reminders, the probability of attending at any date t is constant in t when the individual is present-biased (i.e. β < 1) but is fully attentive (i.e. λ = 0) and is not a mental accountant (i.e. δ = 0)." Indeed when λ = 0 and δ = 0, the probability of attending at t is simply F [βb], which is time invariant. Implication 2. "With no reminders, if the individual is inattentive (i.e. λ > 0) and / or is a mental accountant (i.e. δ > 0), then the probability of attending at any date t is decreasing in t ." This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the probability of attention 1 − λρ(t ) and the discount factor δ(1 − ρ(t )) are both decreasing in t .
We shall now consider the effect that reminders have, by comparing two individuals, one of whom receives reminders every τ period, while the other never receives reminders (this user's attention is only attracted by the initial stimulus of membership). Consider two dates: a first date t = zτ, at which the former individual has received the last of z reminders, and a later date t = zτ + dt with dt < τ. For the individual who receives reminders, the time span between date t and the last stimulus is dt, while for the second individual it is simply t (the stimulus being just the membership subscription in this case). The difference in the probability of attending at t of the two individuals in question is thus:
where Pr(d t = 1) is the probability of attending at t of an individual receiving no reminders. The first term is the result of limited memory (it vanishes when λ = 0), while the second is due to mental accounting (it vanishes when δ = 0) and both effects are positive. We will refer to this positive difference as the "attendance-increasing effect of reminders". (See figure 5 in the appendix for a plot of the probabilities of being attentive for the two types of individuals.) Implication 3. "The probability of attending at any date is unaffected by reminders if the individual is both fully attentive and not a mental accountant. If, on the other hand, the individual is a mental accountant and / or inattentive, then reminders will increase the probability of attendance." Implication 4. "If the individual is inattentive but not a mental accountant (i.e. λ > 0, δ = 0), then the attendance-increasing effect of reminders rises over time during the period of the membership."
Re-writing (4) with δ = 0, the difference in the probabilities in fact increases in t for a given t. Implication 5. "If the individual is a mental accountant but attentive (i.e. λ = 0, δ > 0), then the attendance-increasing effect of reminders may wane during the course of the membership, and will certainly decline in the mental account (possibly vanishing when the account is in the black)."
Rewriting (4) with λ = 0 and assuming uniform cost distribution for the sake of simplicity, we obtain
Now we have two contrasting forces, since the square bracket is increasing but ∆v(A t ) is decreasing in t (remember that A t is weakly increasing in t and v(·) is concave). When the second effect prevails then the increase in the probability of attendance induced by reminders decreased over time. Likewise, for a given date, a larger mental account implies the weaker effect of reminders. This is even more so if function v(·) is discontinuous at zero, being more concave when the account is in the red and less so when it is in the black. 10 We shall be examining implication 3 regarding the effects of reminders on attendance in Section 4. Implications 1, 2, 4 and 5 will be examined in Section 5.
The field experiment
We conducted our study in a gymnasium owned and managed by a sports association for university students in Bologna (Italy). 11 The gym offers a menu of contracts as is customary in this sector consisting of flat-rate memberships of various lengths (one, two, three months and the entire academic year) as well as pay-per-visit ticket. 12 Unlike other gyms (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006, for example), there is no automatic renewal of contracts; thus users who discover they do not enjoy the gym's activities, are very likely to stop going altogether after the first membership expiries. For each student purchasing a right to enter the gym (a contract) during the period January 1 st 2008 -July 31 st 2010, we observed the choice of contracts and that student's actual attendance (with the date and time of each visit) as recorded at the gym entrance by means of an electronic key. 13 The average monthly attendance in the gym is 7.3, which is rather high when compared with other studies in this field.
We conducted our field experiment starting in September 2009. We recruited students by sending e-mails to the gym's mailing list of all students who had ever purchased any type of contract, and by distributing posters and fliers at the gym. The advertisement announced a remunerated online survey of sports and of students' lives, without mentioning the nature of our field experiment. 14 Students willing to participate registered through our web site with personal credentials. At the moment of registration, each user was assigned to a treated group or to a control group (8 subjects out of 10 were assigned to be treated). Each treated user then received a weekly e-mail containing no individual information, but simply reminding him/her the opportunity to attend the gym (see the appendix for the wording of the message and the exact delivery dates). Reminders did not offer any information about other users, or the list of recipients of the reminders. At any time, treated users could also freely decide to log-in to a personalized web page, which we monitored, displaying actual attendance during the current membership (i.e. the number of visits so far) and the implicit final cost of each visit based on a forecast steady frequency of attendance until the end of the membership. Finally, they could unsubscribe the weekly e-mail (although only two users did so). 15 Users in the control group did not receive any reminders, nor could they access the personalized web page.
The timing of the experiment was as follows. On September 1 st 2009 our web-site became accessible. Once they had registered, treated users started receiving the weekly reminders, and these ended either when the recipients permanently quit the gym, or at the end of the experiment which, unknown to them, was set for March 16 th 2010. Since the gym closes for one month on July 31 st (in line with the academic year), we were able to collect data on attendance also after treatment. 13 The performance of the gym and its staff is monitored by the sport association which pays the staff's salaries and provides incentives to monitor gym access and to utilize the electronic keys provided.
14 In addition to the survey, we organized online cognitive and non-cognitive tests and experiments on risk and time preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002) . For the survey and the tests we paid each participant e5. For the risk and time experiment, one out of five participants received a payment based on actual choices (this payment ranged from e10 to e80, with an average of e25). For a detailed analysis of all these activities see Nardotto (2010) . We set up the web site to be employed for the purposes of our survey, using PHP, MySQL and a dynamic interface in Javascript. 15 We prepared a calendar tool to plan the dates of future activities and to check actual attendance ex-post, but this was given scant attention (only 15 users). We also provided a "contract optimizer" which would find the least costly solution based on expected attendance and given time horizon, but once again this tool was little used. Figure 1 illustrates the treatment timeline for a user who subscribed memberships pre-, during-and post-treatment. Each line represents the time span of a given membership of this user: a dashed line indicates that the user did not receive any reminders, while a normal line indicates that the user received the weekly e-mails in those periods. Since users may register at different times, and may also terminate their activity at the gym on different dates, the precise dates separating the three periods pre-, during-and post-treatment, differ from one user to another. We consider as pre-treatment those contracts (or portions of contracts) falling before the web site registration date, during-treatment those falling between registration and the end of the experiment (March 16 th 2010), and post-treatment those falling after that date.
In the counterfactual for our treatment, we also included users who had attended the gym during the previous academic year (2008) (2009) ) provided that they have signed contracts in the corresponding periods of that year (i.e. pre-, during and after treatment). Indeed, their attendance in the corresponding pre-treatment period of the previous year was very similar to attendance of the treated group during the year of the experiment. 16 Our analysis will be based on two samples: the first, a restricted sample limited to users who purchased at least one contract in each of the three periods, pre-, during-and post-treatment (we will refer to them as "non-quitters" since they are active for a long period even after treatment), and second, larger sample of those who purchased at least one contract in the first two periods. The former sample consists of 144 users (50 treated users and 94 control users), while the latter sample consists of 247 users (89 treated users and 158 control users). 17
16 Furthermore, since users who had been gym members for a long time were very likely to participate in our experiment, users from the previous year with a similarly lengthy membership record in fact constitute a good counterfactual.
17 243 users registered through our web site, corresponding to more than half (55%) of the gym population.
Reminders increase attendance
We now compare the monthly attendance of treated and control users during the three periods in question (pre-, during-and post-treatment). Using first the sample of nonquitters enables us to compare the performance of treated and control groups also after treatment has ceased. Since none of these users quit during treatment, we can investigate the effects of reminders at the intensive margin. We shall then verify whether reminders also affected the decision to quit the gym or not after the treatment, thus verifying the effects of reminders at the extensive margin.
Attendance figures are reported in Figure 2 . The upper panel shows average attendance
All users
Low-attendance users High-attendance users of all treated and control users during the three periods. In the two lower panels we can distinguish high-attendance and low-attendance users by separating users according to a
Within this group, we cannot use all treated users since some of them purchased just one contract before treatment, and then quit the gym permanently.
threshold corresponding to the average attendance of the entire population during the pretreatment period (i.e. 9 visits per month).
Comparing pre-and during-treatment, the change in attendance for each one of the six groups (treated and controls for all users, for high-attendance and for low-attendance users) is shown in the first column of Table 1 , together with the difference between such changes among treated and control users (a difference-in-difference, shown in the second column). We first investigate all users. Before treatment, control and treated users display very similar behavior in terms of monthly attendance. On average they attend the gym 9 times a month, and statistical tests do not reject the null hypothesis of equal mean for treated and control users (Wilcoxon test, p-value=0.72). It should be said that our users are quite active compared with those featured in previous studies (for more on this see below). Now consider the evolution of attendance over the three periods (the top panel in Figure  2 ). The attendance of control users (the solid line) strongly decreases when entering the during-treatment period. This decline is mainly due to two factors. Enthusiasm at the moment of enrolment tends to diminsh over time (this has been documented also by other studies). Seasonal factors are also important since the treatment months are characterized by cold winter weather, which is associated with lower attendance. 18 On the contrary, the attendance of treated users (the dashed line) does not decline significantly when entering the during-treatment period, reaching on average one more visit than that of the control users. The difference-in-difference of behavior of the treated users compared to the control users 18 Estimating the probability of attendance at any calendar date (as we will do in the model (5) discussed below), temperature turns out to have a hump shaped effect with an attendance maximizing temperature at 14
• C, which is exactly the mean annual temperature. The treatment period turns out to be characterized by mean monthly temperature ranging in between 2.3-13
is statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, p-value=0.028), as shown in Table 1 (first row, first column). Hence, reminders do have an effect in increasing attendance and preventing treated users from attending less frequently over the course of time, as is the case instead for the control users. This is a first test of Implication 3 illustrated in Section 2, and shows that a significant part of our population is composed of individuals who are, at the very least, inattentive and / or mental accountants. Many of our individuals are also present-biased (as shown in details in Nardotto, 2011), but, as explained in Implication 3, this bias alone cannot explain users' positive reaction to reminders. Regardless of the treatment and periods in question, on average our user were active accessing the gym more than twice a week. 19 This attendance rate is significantly higher than in other studies conducted on students and non-students (see the Introduction), and thus the result of reminders is even more striking. CG reported that their monetary incentives had a (post-treatment) effect on their "non-regular" users but had no significant effect on "regular" users, that is, on those attending more than 1.6-2 times per week before treatment, a figure which is actually even less than that of our low-attendance users.
It is thus interesting to further specify the previous analysis by subdividing the population into high-attendance and low-attendance users, defined according to the average pretreatment attendance, as shown in the bottom two panels of Figure 2 and the bottom rows of Table 1 . Results here are even more striking: for low-attendance users, comparing prewith during-treatment, treated users reveals an increase of 1.92 visits per month compared with control users, an increase of 25% in monthly visits. This (difference-in-) difference is significant despite the reduction in the sample size (Wilcoxon test p-value=0.0084). Although our result on the effect of reminders is statistically significant also for the entire population, this effect is mainly driven by low-attendance users. For high-attendance users, we observe a decreasing trend in attendance for both treated and control users. Differences that we observe for these high-attendance users are very small and never statistically significant.
What is the change of attendance following the end of the treatment? Coming back to all (high-attendance and low-attendance) users, the treated group displayed a decline in attendance and convergence towards the control group, although a (non-significant) difference persists. This is in line with our model of inattention, since as soon as reminders cease to be sent, the path of inattention during the month is restored. The fact that, contrary to CG, we do not perceive a significant effect on habit formation, may be attributed to two determinants. Firstly, we use a longer period after treatment as explained above (4.5 instead of 2.5-3 months). Secondly, our low-attendance users are much more active than their non-regular counterparts (with approximately 7 and 3 visits per month, respectively), which would seem to suggest that it is much more difficult to induce a persistent change of habit in our users.
However, focusing on low-attendance users in the post-treatment period, attendance displays however a path that closely resembles the one reported by CG and Acland and Levy (2011). After 2 months, i.e. considering the period between March 16 th and May 16 th , the (difference-in) difference of attendance between the two groups reduces from 1.92 to 1.44 visits per month. The reduction considering the entire post-treatment period is further reduced to 0.75.
We can now confirm our results regarding the effects of reminders, with the help of a regression analysis, where we also employ the larger sample containing those users who have signed contracts during the pre-treatment and during-treatment periods at least. Table 2 shows a linear regression where the dependent variable is represented by the number of monthly visits, while the main regressors are the dummy for being treated, the dummy that identifies the memberships that belong to the treatment period (labeled "During") and the interaction between the two. The model also includes demographic characteristics, D u , of each user u, such as age, gender, academic background, a dummy for receiving financial aid from the university, the distance between home and the gym, a variable which is important in determining attendance, as well as the average local weather conditions W t (temperature and rain) of the period in question. The first column shows the estimated coefficient of the regression performed on the entire population, the second and third columns show the equivalent performed on the lowattendance users from the restricted sample of non-quitters (i.e. those purchasing contracts in all the three periods, pre-, during, and post-treatment), while the last two columns show the regression performed on the low-attendance users from the larger sample of users who joined for at least the first two periods. The said estimated coefficients confirm previous findings, namely that reminders have a substantial effect on the number of monthly visits to the gym, and this effect is much stronger in the case of low-attendance users. Indeed, the dummy for treated users is not significant in itself, but is positive and significantly different from zero when it interacts with the dummy for the period in which the treatment was ongoing. The size of the coefficient for low-attendance users implies a change in monthly visits for low-attendance users of 1.7 to 2.2, depending on the sample we consider and on the specifications, and it is always highly significant.
In a second regression, using the sample of non-quitters, we estimate the probability of attendance at any calendar date t for user u, employing the following model
where Reminder t is a dummy equal to one when we consider a day t featuring a reminder, M D t is a vector containing monthly dummies and dummies for the days of the week, W t is now a vector of daily local weather conditions. 20 We perform the regression using indivudal fixed effects. Since we do not observe precisely when our e-mail is actually read (this depends on how frequently users check their e-mails), we consider a day to be treated if we sent the e-mail the day before, or on the same day before 12:00 (the gym is open from 7:00 to 22:00). The strong, highly significant effect of reminders is shown in Table 3 . Our treatment may also have an effect on the composition of the treated group (i.e. an effect on the extensive margin). For example, treatment may discourage those who do not perform well and attend very rarely, or on the contrary it may mean that treated users, who are induced to attend more, are also more likely to continue exercising, thus renewing their memberships. In a regression reported in the appendix (see Table 8 ), we show that being treated with our reminders has no statistically significant effect on the probability of quitting the gym. 20 In order to guarantee homogeneity of the day-to-day incentive to attend (as defined by inequality (2)), we restrict the analysis to monthly memberships, which are by far the most common choice from among the gym's menu of contracts (representing 63% of all purchases in the gym, see Table 7 in the appendix). P-values in parenthesis * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Why do reminders lead to an increase in attendance?
Results in the previous section show that reminders do in fact increase attendance levels, while our theoretical model in Section 2 shows that (Implication 3) fully rational individuals, and even present-biased users, should not be affected by reminders. On the other hand, individuals paying limited attention and / or using mental accounting ought to be affected by reminders. As further verification of the presence of at least one of these two biases in our population, we shall first test Implications 1 and 2 according to which attendance should decrease over time within a given membership period if an individual is inattentive and / or is a mental accountant. We shall then try to identify which of the two biases is more responsible for the effects of reminders, by testing Implications 4 and 5. Figure 3 plots the density of recorded attendance in the gym (probability of visit) in each of the 31 days of monthly memberships (we consider the before-treatment period so that reminders have no effect here). 21 Simple inspection shows that there is a clearly decreasing trend over the course of a month. The spikes correspond to the first day, given that when users pay for membership they are physically present at the gym and immediately take advantage of their entitlement to attend, and every seven days, since the week day of purchase and of first attendance tends to be the preferred day of the week. The day after a spike the probability of a visit drops, since although our users are quite active, it is rare for them to attend on two consecutive days.
In order to further and more precisely analyze this decline in attendance within a membership period, we explicitly model attendance during a given membership period using the following linear probability model for observing a visit in day t during membership j taken 21 We exclude longer contractual options which may be strongly affected by seasonal factors. The analysis in this section is based on "non-quitters", i.e. those users with subscriptions pre-, during, and post-treatment. out by user u, P (V isit in day t,j,u ) = γ 2 2 nd week+γ 3 3 rd week+γ 4 4 th week+γ 5 Remaining days+β 1 M D t +β 2 W t (6) The main explanatory variables of interest are the dummy variables for the four weeks of the membership period (plus a dummy for the remaining days). We use the first week as the baseline for these dummies. 22 As before, we control for weather conditions with W t , seasonality with M D t (monthly dummies), and we include individual fixed effects. The analysis is performed on two samples: the first, labeled "pooled", refers to pre-treatment attendance and pools all users, the second, labeled "treated" refers to the attendance of treated users only, during the treatment period. All regressions are performed with individual fixed effects. The results of the estimation are reported in the first two columns of Table 4 .
The estimated coefficients of the first column (pre-treatment) delineate the decreasing path identified in Figure 3 : attendance falls during the course of the month, at an everincreasing rate, reaching a reduction of 9% in the last fourth and final week. A standard t-test on the week dummy variables leads us to reject the null hypothesis of joint equality to 0 (p-value= <.00001). 23 This result is confirmed by estimated coefficients in column 22 We divided the month on a seven day basis in order to obtain the first (preferred) day of each week.
The first week spans from the 1 st to the 7 th day, the second from the 8 th to the 14 th , the third from the 15 th to the 21 st , and the fourth from the 22 nd to the 28 th . We include the dummy on the remaining days since some monthly memberships, due to calendar effects, may be slightly longer than others. 23 A single t-test performed on couples of coefficients led to the following results: firstly, H0 : γ2 = γ3 P-values in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 2 of the Table, where the same regression is performed on the sample of treated users during-treatment. 24 It is also worth to emphasize that all the analyses in this section are based on users buying several memberships over time (i.e. precisely those defined above as "non-quitters"). Thus we can exclude that the observed declining attendance is simply a consequence of users purchasing just one membership, the first, and then gradually reducing attendance when they realize they do not like the activity at the gym.
The results shown so far refer to Implications 1 and 2, and suggest that a significant is not rejected (p-value=0.101); secondly, H0 : γ2 = γ4 is strongly rejected (p-value= <0.0001); thirdly: H0 : γ3 = γ4 is rejected at 5%, (p-value=0.013); and fourthly: H0 : γ2 = γ5 is strongly rejected, (pvalue=0.0083) . 24 In an extended regression (not reported here) on both samples (pre-and during treatment) and with interactions terms between weeks and the dummy for the treatment period, we do not reject the null hypothesis of joint zero restriction on all such interactions terms.
part of our users is affected by limited memory and / or mental accounting. The next step in our investigation is to try and disentangle these two biases limited memory and / or mental accounting (Implications 4 and 5).
In Table 5 we consider the effects on the daily probability of attendance (of those with monthly memberships), as in Table 3 above, the difference being that we now study the effects of the different reminders sent during the course of the month's membership (reminders are aggregated in pairs in the first column or in groups of three in the second column). The table shows that reminders continue to increase attendance throughout the Reminders x and y is a dummy that takes value 1 if reminder x or reminder y is affecting this day. E.g. Reminders 1 and 2 takes value 1 if the day is affected by the first or by the second reminder within the subscription.
membership period, and, if anything, the effect is stronger in the case of the last reminders sent. This observation, although interesting in itself, is hardly conclusive since it does not enable us to exclude either limited attention or mental accounting (Implications 4 and 5 could have led us to exclude limited memory had we found a decreasing effect of reminders during the membership). A direct test of mental accounting comes with Implication 5, which shows that for a mental accountant the attendance-increasing effects of reminders ought to diminish as the account shifts from the red into the black. This is precisely what Table 6 shows: the daily probability to attend is increased by reminders by a measure which is much higher when the account is in red than when it is in black (in the latter case its statistical significance also diminishes). This observation suggests that mental accounting ought to be considered an important factor, at least when users receive reminders.
Mental accounting, however, seems not to be the only explanation of our observations: whether the account is in the red or in the black is of little importance in normal times, i.e. pre-treatment, as shown by column 3 of the previous Table 4 (the sign of "Red account" is positive, as expected, but small and not significant). In this case, the leading factor for observed decreasing attendance throughout the membership period should rather be limited memory.
In keeping with what we have just shown in the previous Table 6, column 4 of Table 4 enables us to show that the status of the account is, on the contrary, strongly significant during treatment: an account in the red increases the probability of a daily visit when users also receive reminders. A mental account in the red becomes the dominant factor during the first weeks of the month, when users are reminded to attend and strive to reach the goal of going into the black in their mental account. Indeed, the figures show that more than 75% of the switches (from red to black) are made in weeks 2 and 3 (36.7% and 40.4%, respectively), while the change in magnitude of the weekly dummy between column 2 and column 4 (both related to treated users in the during-treatment period) further testifies to the importance of the mental account in determining attendance behavior. The effect of going into the black in the second and third weeks is reflected by the account dummy, and the weeks thereafter (the third and fourth weeks, together with any remaining days), which display a strongly reduced effect. 25 We conclude this section illustrating the information that we have collected about users acquiring feedback information on past attendance of their actual membership through the personalized web page set up for the purposes of our experiment (see Section 3 for more details). These were 26 such (treated) users and the picture illustrates the density (across Figure 4 : Days between the day of switch (set at t=0) and of acquiring feedback. all users) of the decision to access the feedback web-page, setting the day on which the status of the mental account switches from "in the red" to "in the black" at zero. We observe two spikes: the first at 3 to 6 days, prior to the switching day of the account; the second spike just after the switch is made. 26 This may suggest that these users seek gratification by seeking confirmation of having performed well at the gym, and looking for this information at two precise moments in time: when they are close to the pivotal visit rendering the account positive, and right after this visit to the gym.
The evidence presented in this section would thus seem to show that our reminders revamp the status of the mental account and thus induce users to attend more frequently. This may, however, not be the only explanation of how it is that reminders have an effect within our framework, since we also found some evidence of limited attention during the 25 In an unreported regression, we ascertained that the status of the mental account is more important for low-attendance users than for high-attendance ones.
26 The days are grouped into threes, so that, for example, the first bar on the left of the switch day covers the three previous days, the second bar considers the fourth, fifth and sixth day before etc. . . pre-treatment period, and also when considering the increasing effect of reminders along the membership period.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the effects of providing reminders of consumption opportunities to individuals who are likely to be inattentive and to use mental accounting strategies. We have tested this possibility by running a field experiment on a sample of individuals joining a gymnasium. We have found that reminders strongly increase the attendance (by up to 25 percent) of those treated users receiving weekly e-mails, especially those who attended the gym less frequently (than the average) prior to treatment. Reminders have an immediate effect a few hours after being received. With the aid of a simple theoretical analysis, we have seen that the common present-preference bias, which has been documented in investment activities such as exercising in a gym, cannot explain the effects of reminders that we observe. Inattention and mental accounting, on the other hand, are two concurrent channels through which reminders may foster attendance. Individuals indeed respond to reminders in a way that is consistent with their being sometimes unaware of the opportunity to attend the gym. Furthermore, reminders have a strong effect on an individual as long as that person's attendance has yet to justify the purchase of a flat-rate membership (i.e. when the up-front membership cost is larger than the overall cost of opting for the alternative pay-per-visit ticket, the difference between these two costs being the current status of that person's mental account). This is further confirmed by individuals' access to feedback on past attendance, as observed during the course of our experiment. As a result of our field experiment, and simply through the use of reminders, we were able to obtain results comparable to those that have been obtained in similar contexts but through resorting to significant monetary incentives. This was the case when considering the during-treatment effect (i.e. when individuals were receiving the weekly e-mails) and, to a smaller extent, also post-treatment when the reminders ceased to be sent.
A word of warning should be given, as always, when extrapolating our results to include different contexts and situations. Nevertheless, we think that they are important in terms of policy implications, since they show that virtuous behavior can be induced using a very inexpensive, but highly effective instrument, namely information, which also limits the risk of crowding out intrinsic motivations.
Our analysis is limited to individuals who, regardless of our treatments, decided to enter the market, in this case the gym, and to attempt to get some exercise. An interesting avenue for future research would be to see if, and how, reminders also induce individuals to actually begin (and then continue) investment activities such as exercising.
A simplistic extrapolation of our results in terms of policy, is that we could try to encourage individuals to undertake various desirable investment activities by simply sending them as many reminders as the activities themselves. However, we envisage that the problem of limited attention would emerge again if many different reminders were competing for an individual's attention, leading to an eventual information overload. An interesting line of research would thus be the determination of the optimal timing and frequency of such reminders.
Additional tables Table 7 illustrates the menu of contracts offered by the gym, the prices and the number of actual purchases of each type of contract during the course of academic year 2009-2010. Table 8 reports marginal effects on the probability to renew (see section 4). 
The treatment
The text of the e-mail sent to treated users during the treatment period is as follows (English translation). Dear student, would you like to know about your present use of GymCus? Go to your personal web page at www2.dse.unibo.it/gymcus/ (send an e-mail to cusb.gym@unibo.it if you have forgotten your login). At the web page entitled "Information about your activities at the gym: learn how to get the most from GymCus!" you can: 1-Check your weekly attendance and associated actual price for single entrance; 2-Plan and check your visits to the gym; 3-Find out the least costly solution that best fits your needs (very useful when you are about to sign up a new membership); 4-Unsubscribe to this e-mail service. Use these information services for a more beneficial use of GymCus! Regards, cusb.gym@unibo.it 
